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Respect for life has been traditional in human society. It is based on 
recognition of human life as a basic good. Life is basic to any other go'od a 
human may have or acquire. Truth demands that one respect life as such a 
good. In our ludaeo-Christian culture this has carried with it several 
demands. It has traditionally demanded that no one take innocent human 
life. This included not only the life of other innocent people but that of the 
person himself or herself. Suicide has been considered as much a violation 
of respect for life as homicide. 
Euthanasia 
It has also been recognized that taking a human life bylO mission is just as 
wrong as taking it by commission. Thus no distinction has been made, e.g., 
between intentionally starving a person and stabbing him to death. Even if 
this is done with a good intention, e.g., out of mercy, it has been considered 
wrong. So what is called euthanasia has always been condemned in our 
society, and this is true of voluntary as well as involuntary euthanasia. The 
only difference between the two is that voluntary euthanasia would 
constitute suicide as well as homicide. 
Duty to Preserve Life 
Respect for life has also had another dimension . A positive duty to 
preserve life has been part of the tradition. This is a duty which runs 
through the whole spectrum of human activity. It affects what one eats, 
what one drinks, what he wears, what kind of work he does, what kind of 
recreation he takes , whenever it involves some risk or danger to life. Again, 
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it affects what he does as well as what he does not do. A person can show 
his lack of respect for life by omission as well as by commission. 
From what has been said above , it should be clear that respect for life 
demands that what the person does or does not do never falls into the 
category of suicide or homicide . This can happen in two ways: (I) if death 
is the only immediate effect of some act or omission; or (2) if death is 
intended either as a means or an end . 
If death is the only immediate effect of the act or omission, it must 
obviously be intended , and therefore must constitute suicide or homicide. 
While this is a possibility, it may happen only rarely, since it does not often 
happen that an act has only one immediate effect. The more usual case 
would be one in which, although the act may have other effects , death is 
intended either as a means or an end. 
Granted that what is done does not fall into either of these categories , it 
has generally been admitted that one does not have to do everything 
possible to preserve life. In other words , there are limits to what the person 
must do or not do to fulfill this duty. Thus, one does not have to rule out 
all danger or risk in the work he does , or even in the recreation he takes. 
Nor does one have to take all treatment necessary to preserve or prolong 
his life. 
Principle of Double Effect 
How does one decide, in these cases , what is of obligation and what is 
optional? In technical language we are dealing here with what is called the 
principle of double effect. In other words , we are dealing with an act which 
has a bad effect, and we are asking about the morality of such an act or 
omission. We have already pointed out that respect for life does not 
demand that we avoid any act or omission that carries with it risk or 
danger to life (bad effect). We have also pointed out that it would not be 
permitted to engage in such activity with the intention of bringing on 
death. But what if the act or omission is placed for som~ other reason? 
How would one determine its morality? 
Besides the requirements already mentioned regarding intention, this 
principle requires that the reason for placing the act or for the omission be 
sufficient to justify the evil effect. We can illustrate with the example ofthe 
space shuttle. Those who have gone up in it were certainly aware of the risk 
to life, yet none of them went up with the intention of ending their lives . 
They went up because of the good this program gave hopes of 
accomplishing. It was generally felt that this was sufficient to warrant the 
risk to life involved . I think it would be generally agreed that, presuming 
that known risk was reduced to a minimum, the conditions of the principle 
of double effect were verified , and going up was morally permissible. 
Nutrition and Hydration 
Our concern here is not with any or every act or omission that carries 
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with it risk to life, but with a specific act. We are concerned with foregoing 
eating and drinking with resulting risk to life or even certain death . The 
question is whether and under what circumstances one may withhold / 
withdraw nutrition and hydration from a patient. 
This question has arisen in recent times in the context of the discussion 
that has taken place over the past ten or more years regarding the 
obligation to take medical treatment. It is generally agreed that the 
obligation to take medical treatment, like the obligation to preserve life, 
has its limitations. The question now being asked is whether the duty to eat 
and drink has the same limits as medical treatment. Or is there a 
difference? 
There is clearly a difference between eating and drinking, and med ical 
treatment. Medical treatment is aimed at curing a disease. Eating and 
drinking are not aimed at curing disease, but at sustaining life. Medical 
treatment is therapeutic; eating and drinking are not basically therapeutic. 
So there is no doubt that eating and drinking, and medical treatment are 
two different procedures, although artificial feeding seems to be a 
combination of both. 
But this does not answcr our question , which is whether there is a 
difference in the obligation to eat and drink , and the obligation to take 
medical treatment. The pertinent question is whether the differences 
pointed out above are morally relevant, that is, whether they would affect 
the moral obligation. Would it, for instance, make the obligation to take 
food and drink an absolute one, whereas the obligation to take medical 
treatment would remain limited? 
Unique Obligation? 
It is my contention that there is no difference between these obligations. 
As already pointed out, there is one duty to preserve life and that duty 
affects everything we do insofar as it involves danger or risk to life. We are 
not speaking of two distinct duties , one to eat and drink, the other to take 
medical treatment. There is only one duty, the duty to preserve life. and 
this duty must be taken into consideration in anything a person does which 
involves risk or danger to life. Since this duty has its limitations , these 
limitations as well as the duty itself affect everything we do . As pointed 
out, it would obviously not be permissible to forego eating and drinking to 
bring on death . But if some other reason were present, it could be justified. 
] think everyone would admit , for instance, that ifthere were only enough 
food and drink for one person, a grandparent could forego eating in favor 
of a grandchild , just as he could forego medical treatment, etc. So I do not 
think one can say that it would be intrinsically evil to forego eating and 
drinking even to the point of death. If the omission can be justified 
according to the principle of double effect, it would be morally 
permissible. We are not asking here whether foregoing food to save the life 
of another can be justified, but whether other reasons can be offered. and 
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if so, what reasons. 
The moral norm that has been generally accepted is that if what is 
omitted is useless in prolonging life or excessively burdensome, and IS 
omitted for this reason, it would be morally permissible. 1 
Useless Means 
If what was omitted was useless, that is, if it would not prolong life 
perceptibly, there would obviously be no obligation to use it. If morality is 
to be reasonable, one cannot impose an obligation on a person to do 
something useless. This would make no sense. Today, however, this 
principle is not being properly used. It is used to free one of an obligation 
to use means if it would not cure some disease. Thus, if a particular disease 
is irreversible, some would want to argue that it would be permissible to 
withdraw even nutrition and hydration, since they could not reverse the 
disease. But this ignores the whole meaning of the question, which is about 
the duty to prolong life, not the duty to cure disease. Obviously, if one were 
talking about the latter, one could not directly impose an obligation to eat 
and drink ... since it would not cure the disease . In fact, one could never 
impose an obligation to eat and drink on this score, since eating and 
drinking, as such, are not therapy. 
So it makes no sense to relate the obligation of nutrition and hydration 
to whether the disease can be reversed or not. The only legitimate reason 
for withdrawing it would be that it would not prolong life perceptibly, so 
that the patient would die within a short space of time whether he ate or 
not. 
Burdensome Means 
What if a means is excessively burdensome? I n that event a patient 
would be permitted to forego the means. This is permissible becaus'e a 
humane morality does not place on a patient an obligation that would be 
too difficult for him to bear or fulfill. I do not think that a9Y distinction can 
be made here between treatment and feeding. For a particular patient 
eating can be just as difficult as treatment. It would not be reasonable to 
demand that such a patient accept one and not the other. Indeed, foregoing 
either would be wrong, as pointed out above, if death was the only 
immediate effect, or if it was intended . But the assumption is that neither is 
or has to be the case. Death is not the only immediate effect. If a means 
(treatment or feeding) is excessively burdensome, refusing treatment has 
another immediate effect . .. avoiding the burden of the treatment or 
feeding . If this is what he intends, omitting eating and drinking could be 
justified as a legitimate application of the principle of double effect. He is 
not doing something wrong in itself, he does not intend the evil effect, and 
he avoids the burden which eating involves. 
When theologians speak of a means to preserve life that is excessively 
burdensome, they usually break it down into hardship, pain, cost or 
danger. lfthe use of some means involved what would be judged excessive 
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in any of these areas, a patient would not be obliged to take it. It would be 
optional. 
Burden to the Family 
Ethicians are 0 bviously speaking of burden to the patient. lfthe burden 
is to the patient, he is relieved of any obligation to use the means. But 
option is not limited to the patient. A patient would be free to omit a means 
to preserve life even if he did so to remove a burden from the family. If a 
patient had no insurance, and he wanted to spare the family the 
astronomic costs some treatments involve today, it would be permissible 
for him to do so. In fact, he might be more concerned about the burden to 
his family than the burden to himself. 
Burden to Society 
In today's society, the burden of cost is usually shifted to some insurance 
company or to society, if he is on medicare or medicaid. So the patient 
cannot often omit treatment because of the burden of cost to himself. 
Would it be permissible for him to omit treatment because of the cost to 
the insurance company, or to society? This is certainly a possibility. But it 
is not likely to happen. At least I have never heard of anyone who refused 
treatment because of the cost to an insurance company, or to society, if he 
was on medicare or medicaid . So although it could happen, it would be 
difficult to make any such presumption in the case of an incompetent 
patient. 
Scarce Facilities 
What about society itself? Could it terminate treatment even against the 
wishes of a patient? Society has the right and duty to distribute its own 
funds. Since it never has enough funds to cover all the needs of a 
community, it must set limits. It would be permissible for society then to 
limit the funds given to health care both in general and in "articular cases ... 
as long as it observes distributive justice. But even in a situation where it 
might legitimately limit funds, it could not legitimately stop treatment 
itself. If the treatment could be provided from other funding, society 
could not stop it. The only situation in which society could stop treatment 
would be one in which treatment facilities themselves were scarce. There 
society could set limits. 
Even in this situation, however, society would be bound by moral 
norms. It would be no more permissible for society to intend the death of 
a patient than it would for the patient himself. So while society may limit 
treatment , it may not do so with the intention of ending the life of a 
patient. Society also has the obligation of not discriminating against 
patients. 
The fact is that society has not set such limits , so the above discussion is 
purely theoretical. I do not think that a court could make a decision on 
this basis. Since it is dealing with only one case, it would be impossible to 
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avoid discrimination. 
Briefly, what we are saying is that it is permissible to forego means to 
preserve life when the use of such means would not appreciably preserve 
life or when, even if it would, it would be excessively burdensome. It would 
not be permissible to forego means to preserve life with the intention of 
bringing on death. 
Quality of Means vs. Quality of Life 
Today this whole discussion has entered into a new phase. In the past, as 
described above, the emphasis was on the means. Sometimes the 
distinction was made between ordinary and extraordinary means to clarify 
the obligation of preserve life. In the past five or ten years a new emphasis 
has been added. Some are looking not only at the means, but the person. 
They would like to distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary 
patients, as well as ordinary and extraordinary means . The underlying 
reason is that they would like to make an allowance for extraordinary 
patients, just as they make for extraordinary means. In other words, they 
would like to withhold or withdraw treatment on the basis of the quality of 
life of the patient as well as the quality of means. Thus, if the quality of life 
of the patient was below a certain standard they would argue that the 
means of preserving life could be withheld or withdrawn . 
Superficially, it would seem that if one could withhold means on the 
basis of the quality of the means , it could be done on the basis of the quality 
of the patient's life . Thus , if one could withhold means because they are 
useless or excessively burdensome, it would seem that one should be able 
to withhold them if the patients's life itself is useless or excessively 
burdensome. Actually, I know of no one who would want to make this 
simple transfer. In general , advocates of this approach are usually much 
more demanding in dealing with quality oflife than they are with quality of 
means. They would argue , for instance, that if a person were in an 
irreversible coma or a persistent vegetative state, it would be permissible to 
withhold means to preserve life, including food and hydration. They 
would not include other incapacitating handicaps . Similarly, they might 
argue that if the patient's life was extremely burdensome, not just 
excessively burdensome, it would be permissible to withhold means to 
preserve life. 
New Moral Category 
What about the morality of this argument? As already indicated , it 
might look as though this wasjust another step in the same direction. And 
this is part ofthe problem .. . the move may not be recognized for what it is. 
Actually, it represents a quantum leap from what is and has been 
considered acceptable. It is not in any way in continuity with past practice , 
but involves a move into an entirely different category of moral act. Let me 
illustrate . When one withholds or withdraws a means to preserve life 
because it is too burdensome, his intention is to spare the patient the 
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burden somehow involved in the use of the means. There is no intention of 
bringing on the death of the patient. Even if the patient lives (as in the 
Quinlan case), the goal is achieved. He or she is spared the burdensome 
means. 
But if one omits some necessary means because of the patient's low 
quality oflife, the intention is to bring the life of the patient to an end, since 
this is the only solution of the problem. Presumably, the patient's 
condition cannot be reversed, so the only solution is the death of the 
patient. 
What this means is that we are omitting treatment, etc., with the 
intention of bringing on death. In other words , we are violating our duty to 
respect life. As we mentioned ea-rlier in this paper, respect for life demands 
that we do nothing (and omit nothing) that involves danger or risk to life 
with the intention of bringing on death. The fact that it is being done with 
good intention, to end the patient's pain , does not change the basic nature 
of the act. It is euthanasia. This has been defined as an act or omission 
\ 
which by nature or by intention brings on the death of the patient out of 
mercy. 2 Both the moral and civil law have always abhorred euthanasia. 
Killing is killing whether it is done with a good intention or not. 
Moral Sensitivity 
Awareness of the magnitude of the step from quality of treatment to 
quality of life is crucial to moral sensitivity in this area. The introduction of 
moral evil into society can be and often is imperceptible, and one can easily 
be lulled into a false sense of security if he underestimates what look like 
small steps. The astronaut who first stepped on to the moon said that it was 
just a small step for a man, but he and everyone else knew that it was a giant 
step for mankind. The same has to be said for the step into quality of life 
reasoning. It may look like a small step, but in reality it is a giant moral 
step. One is entering into an entirely different category of moral act . .. 
intentionally bringing on death . If one makes this m<tve under the illusion 
that it is a small step and in continuity with the past, he will be blissfully, 
but also sadly, ignorant of the disastrous implications of what he is doing. 
He is leaping in the dark. What is even worse is the failure to realize that 
this leap will land him on a slippery slope, and with no braking power. 
It would be bad enough if we could limit this quality of life move to an 
extreme case of rare occurrence. For the reason given above, the truth is 
that we have no effective way of controlling it, or of drawing a legitimate 
line. In other words, there is no acceptable or manageable criterion that 
can be used to justify withdrawal of treatment in some cases and 
legitimately exclude it in others. Once the line between quality of treatment 
and quality of life is crossed, there is no effective way of drawing another 
line. As pointed out above, we are on a slippery slope with no braking 
power. Today, we are intentionally ending the life of a person in an 
irreversible coma or a persistent vegetative state. Tomorrow, it will be the 
person with Alzheimer's disease. The next day , any Alzheimer's chronic 
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mental patient will qualify. Then, or even before, incapacitating physical 
handicaps will be considered. There is no way in which one can take the 
first step, or the second step and stop there. This threat is aggravated by the 
fact that the judgment in these cases is made mostly by third parties, with 
all the hazards this implies. We will eventually or sooner find ourselves in a 
society in which only those with an optimal qual it y of life will be secure . .. 
the opposite to <' democratic society in which all are considered equal. 
That this is nl.t alljust fantasy is clear from a recent art icl e in the Nell' 
England Journal oj' Medicine .3 There the statement is made that it is 
ethically permissible to withhold nutrition administered by .. . gastr ic tu be 
from "severely and irreversibly demented patients" as we ll as from the 
"pleasantly senile." 
Wishes of Patient 
What if the patient had made a li ving will , or indicated in some other 
way that if he or she is ever in an irreversible or incurable condition, he 
does not want treatment, even artificia l feeding? It is quite true that the 
decision regarding treatment is up to the patient. But from a moral 
perspective, the patient is not at liberty to decline all and any treatment, 
especially nutrition and hydration. If a patient foregoes treatment that is 
not burdensome and will prolong life, he is going beyond his legitimate 
option, and violating his duty to respect life. Even if a patient were to make 
such a request. those responsible for her could not condone it or freely 
cooperate with it. This, of course, puts the attending physician in a difficult 
position, at least from a legal perspective. What is clear is that a request by 
the patient will not justify the omission of treatment when this would be 
immoral. 
Hopeless Case 
Advocates of a quality of life approach to justify withdrawing means to 
preserve life will frequently give as their reason the fact hat a particular 
case is hopeless. Hopeless can frequently mean many things. If it means ' 
that there is no hope of cure, it cannot be a va lid reason for withdrawing 
the means to preserve life. Many diseases are incurable, e.g., diabetes, but 
no one would suggest that one should not give a diabetic insulin because 
the disease cannot be cured. So the fact that the condition cannot be cured 
is not in itself the reason for withdrawing treatment. When a case is called 
hopeless in the present context. it seems to mean not only that the 
condition is not curable, but that the quality of life of the patient is so low 
that it is useless to continue it. Again we are dealing with a quality of life 
reason in which the solution is the death of the patient. 
It is also argued that means to preserve life, including feeding, may be 
removed when the patient is in what is called a persistent vegetat ive state. 
Whether a human being who is still alive can be said to be in a persistent 
vegetative state can be seriously challenged. As long as a human soul is 
present (and this is the case until the patient is at least brain-dead) human 
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life is present. It is not just vegetative life. Also , the only thing we are sure 
about in these cases is that the patient cannot communicate with the 
outside world . We are not at all sure that he or she cannot receive some 
communication from outside. Nor can we rule out some kind of interior 
life. To say that there is only vegetative life in a human being who is still 
alive goes beyond any evidence we have . 
'Natural' Death 
Some will want to argue that prolonging life by treatment or artificial 
feeding is putting off the natural time of death, and so cannot be 
obligatory. Before accepting this objection, which really proves more than 
the opposition would want, one would have to know the answer to the 
question: when is death natural? If we go back into the Old Testament, we 
will come to a time when any kind of human interventioJ;l in disease was 
considered interfering with Divine Providence. I believe it was the prophet 
Sirach who argued that yod created the herbs and the drugs, just as He 
created food and drink , and endowed the doctor with knowledge to cure 
the sick , and so wanted us to use them just as we use His other gifts. So 
prolonging life by using these gifts is not interfering with Divine 
Providence, but really cooperating with it. 
Noone today would argue that all therapy involves interference with 
nature or Divine Providence. But some even today seem to want to 
maintain that there are times , such as in the case of a person in a persistent 
vegetative state, when one should withdraw and let nature take its course. 
We have already pointed out that there are times when treatment is 
optional, but this is because the treatment is useless or excessively 
burdensome. We do not judge it optional because, in a particular case, we 
think a judgment can be made that death is natural. I know of no way of 
making such ajudgment except in the case where death is going to occur in 
a short time whether treatment is used or not. But this kind of judgment is 
neither necessary nor helpful. So it makes no sense to, talk about putting 
off natural death . 
Intending Death or Letting Die 
In the same vein, some will maintain that in these cases they are not 
intending death, but letting death occur or letting nature take its course. 
There is certainly a clear distinction between intending and permitting or 
allowing. One who omits a burdensome treatment to spare the patient the 
burden of the treatment does not intend the death of the patient. If death 
happens , he merely permits it. But one who withholds or withdraws the 
means to preserve life to let death occur is not just a passive observer. What 
he does or fails to do is instrumental in bringing about the death of the 
patient. This is especially true in the case offeeding. If the patient dies . one 
cannot say that the death comes from the original disease. He dies of 
starvation. And even in the case where some treatment is stopped , 
although the disease may ultimately account for the death of the patient. 
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the omission of the treatment brings it about sooner, thus shortening the 
patient's life. It is quite true that an act or omission from which death 
results is not in itself immoral. It is when this is done precisely to end or 
shorten the life of the patient that it becomes immoral. Since this is what 
happens when some means to preserve life is not provided or withdrawn, it 
is our contention that it constitutes intentional euthanasia by omission. 
Briefly, then , even ifone does not place some positive act of violence, but 
simply omits something necessary to preserve life, he cannot say that he is 
just letting death occur, or letting nature take its course. If death results 
from his failure to do something he can easily do, and this is his intention, 
he is doing more than just letting it happen. He intends what happens 
because this is the solution to his problem. And this is immoral. 
REFERENCES 
I . Such a means has been traditionally called an "extraordinary" means. A means which 
was useful and not burdenso me was considered "ordinary" means. and obligatory. This 
di st inction means different things to different people. and so has gone out of favor. 
2. This definition was given in the Declara/ion on EUThanasia of the Sacred 
Congregation for the Faith (1980) but it is commonly accepted. 
3. The Phl'.I'ician\ Resp ol1.1' iiJilill" TOlI 'ard Hopeles.I'h!ll Paliel1ls. Sidney H. Wanze r et 
al.. 310:15 (April 12. 1984). 955. 
26 Linacre Quarterly 
